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ANNOTATING THE NEWS: MITIGATING THE EFFECTS OF
MEDIA CONVERGENCE AND CONSOLIDATION
Eric B. Easton*
Our goal is to have every one ofour hard news programs fully convergent,
fully interactive andflexible in both old and new media. Bob Murphy,

ABC News.'
I would prefer ABC not to cover Disney ....
ABC News knows that I
would prefer them not to cover [Disney]. Michael Eisner, Chairman,
Walt Disney Company.'

I. INTRODUCTION
Convergence and consolidation-the promise and the power. What
a breathtaking paradox we face as we enter the twenty-first century.
Never before has our ability to inform the public been greater. Breaking

news from anywhere in the world appears on television screens in
minutes. Supporting documents, first-person accounts, government
reaction, public opinion-all follow in a torrent on personal computer
screens. As the two screens converge, as the two streams of information
become one, we are about to realize the promise of a nearly perfect
technology forjournalism-atechnology capable of delivering the news
at any desired level of detail, from highly mediated to raw and bleeding.
That is, except for one problem: we are ignored by much of our
potential audience. Of those who do attend, many, perhaps most,
despise us because we are "the media" existing not to serve the public
interest, but our own. We are not Lincoln Steffens or Edward R.
* Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. I must confess
to writing this essay as a law professor whose concept of the First Amendment is
informed by more than 20 years as a practicing journalist. Even though I turned in my
press card some years ago, I have tried to bring ajournalist's perspective and voice to
this topic. The editorial "we" that creeps into my language suggests a presumption that
other journalists are of similar mind on the issues covered here. My apologies to those
who are not.
I would also like to express my appreciation to Professor Richard Peltz of the
University of Arkansas at Little Rock for inviting me to participate in this symposium

and to the scholars, journalists and friends who made the symposium such a rewarding
experience. Thanks to my Baltimore colleagues Professors Michael Meyerson and
Lynn McLain, who read and critiqued this essay, as well as my research assistant Sam
Collings and the students in my Cyberspace Law Seminar. They share fully in the
credit for whatever may be useful about this essay; I am solely responsible for the rest.
1. Richard Tedesco, ABC News Tests Net, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Jan. 3, 2000,
at 87.
2. Elizabeth Lesly Stevens, Mouse.keofear, BRILL'SCoNTENT, Dec. 1998/Jan. 1999,
at 95 (quoting Eisner's interview on National Public Radio's Fresh Air, Sept. 29, 1998).
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Murrow; we are not even William Randolph Hearst or Joseph Pulitzer;
we are General Electric and Walt Disney, selling ovens, cartoons, and,
oh yes, the news. And as we buy and sell each other, we become bigger,
wealthier, more powerful, and, ultimately, more corrupt. In our struggle
to cling to our audience, we eschew hard news, wallow in feel-good
features, become boosters for local government, and betray the public.
No wonder they hate us.
This essay is a personal inquiry into the nature of media technology, law, and ethics in an era marked by the convergence of media that
have been largely separate-print, broadcast, cable, satellite, and the
Intermet-and by the consolidation of ownership in all of these media.'
What inventions, practices, and norms must emerge to enable us to take
advantage of this vast new information-based world, while preserving
such important professional values as diversity, objectivity, reliability,
and independence?'
Part II of this essay describes my underlying premise that the
solution lies partly in an Internet-based system of documentation and
annotation. I argue that the greatest threat to that vision is an unconstitutionally broad reading of copyright law. Part III explores the doctrinal
implications of the Copyright and Patent Clause and the First Amendment's penumbral "right to know," both of which are crucial to reducing
this threat. Part IV offers concrete examples to demonstrate the
practical effect of combining these two constitutional provisions.
Finally, Part V suggests that even this creative use of constitutional law
will not be enough to protect our values from the exigencies of the
modem media market. I argue that we must also take a new look at
employment relationships and ethical principles with a view toward
ensuring that we carry our highest ideals and aspirations into the new
century.

3. Nothing more clearly epitomizes this trend than the proposed acquisition of
Time-Warner by America Online, Inc. See America Online, Inc., Press Release, AOL &
Time Warner Will Merge to Create World's First Internet-Age Media & Communications

Company (visited July 11, 2000) <http://media.web.aol.com/media/search.cftn>.
Another example is the so-called "strategic alliance" between NBC News/MS-NBC
and Washington Post/Newsweek. See Mike Hoyt, With 'StrategicAlliances, ' the Map Gets

Messy, COLUM. JOURNALISM. REv., Jan./Feb. 2000, at 72.
4. See generally American Society of Newspaper Editors, Journalism Values

Institute (visited July 11, 2000) <http://www.asne.org/works/jvi/viconte.htm>; JACK
FULLER, NEWS VALUES: IDEAS FOR AN INFORMATION AGE (1996).
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II. INTERNET-BASED SOLUTION

I begin with the assumption that the development of a global,
universally accessible Internet offers the best counterweight to the
consolidation of mainstream media in the hands of a relatively few
As long as the
multibillion-dollar, multinational corporations.'
infrastructure and architecture of the Internet remain free and open to
all,6 the technology that allows each person to become a publisher will
yield ways of enhancing the diversity of voices when a media oligopoly
would homogenize, distort, or even silence them."
Next, imagine a world, not too far in the future, where television
news is delivered digitally through a "box" that also carries telephone
service and Internet connections.' As the traditional journalist offers her
mediated version of the day's news, links to supplementary information
and contrasting views are also appearing on the screen-some posted by
the underlying media company, others by organizations or individuals
that you have chosen to trust. 9
5. See, e.g., DEAN ALGER, MEGAMEDIA: How GiANTCoRPORATIONS DOMINATE MASS
MEDIA, DISTORT COMPETITION, AND ENDANGER DEMOCRACY (1998); Project on Media
Ownership, Welcome to PROMO (visited July 11,2000) <http://www.midwestbookseller.
com/guest.html>. But see Paul Farhi, How Bad Is Big, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Dec. 1999,
at 29.
6. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). "We
can build, or architect or code cyberspace to protect values that we believe are
fundamental, or we can build, or architect, or code cyberspace to allow those values to
disappear." Id. at 6. But see David Post, What LarryDoesn't Get: A LibertarianResponse
to Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (visited July 11, 2000) <http://www.temple.
edu/lawschool/dpost/Code.html>.
7. In some cases, antitrust law may provide structural safeguards for First
Amendment values, although care must be taken lest this become a back door for the
kind of government regulation that I argue should be rejected. See, e.g., Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) ("Freedom of the press from
governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of
that freedom by private interests."); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 5.12 U.S. 622, 657
(1994) ("The First Amendment's command that government not impede the freedom
of speech does not disable the government from taking steps to ensure that private
interests not restrict, through physical control of a critical pathway of communication,
the free flow of information and ideas."). Application ofantitrust law to media mergers
and acquisitions is beyond the scope of this essay.
8. See generally Don West, 2000 Millenniavision, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Jan. 3,
2000, at 38.
9. By "trust," I do not necessarily mean "agree with," but, rather, "find reliable
for the purpose intended." The inventor ofthe World Wide Web, Tim Berners-Lee, has
called trust the greatest prerequisite for a web-like society. "The criteria a person uses
to assign trust can range from some belief held by their mother to a statement made by
one company about another. The Freedom to choose one's own trust criteria is as
important a right as any." TiM BERNERS-LEE,WEAVING THE WEB 126 (1999). See also
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You watch the news interactively, pausing the digital video signal
long enough to read some portion of the original documents, view some
hostile commentary, and make up your own mind. The viewer, not the
media empire, controls the message.
Documentation and annotation are essential tools for ensuring a
diversity of voices and other values that are fundamental to this vision
of the new media environment. Documentation, support for the
mediated news story posted by the original provider, not only offers
additional information but, more importantly, reinforces the consumer's
confidence in the validity of the journalist's work product. Many
mainstream news broadcasts and newspaper articles already carry the
message that additional information is available through the broadcaster's or publisher's web site. The quotation that begins this essay
refers to an ABC experiment in precisely this kind of documentation,
ultimately in an interactive television environment."0 Documentation
may be a technological challenge, but presents no particular legal
problem.
Annotation, on the other hand, includes supporting or contradictory
references, endorsement or criticism, posted by a competing news
service, an interested individual or organization, or information
consumers themselves. Long a staple of Usenet newsgroups, annotation
is perhaps the defining feature of the Internet as a medium for mass
communication." Already, people jump onto the Internet when a major
news story is breaking, surfing the web on their personal computers
while CNN is blaring from the television set.' 2 An interactive media
web site might well include online links, discussion boards, or chat
rooms that can provide at least the illusion of annotation. 3
Like documentation, annotation is a mechanism for disseminating
information and testing its reliability. But it is a far more powerful tool
when, and then precisely because, it comes from diverse sources,
beyond the control of "the media." Indeed, critical annotation might be
ESTHER DYSON, RELEASE 2.0 251-53 (1997).
10. See Tedesco, supra note 1. See also Rachel Alexander, Take Me Out to the Web
Site, WASH. POST, May 14,2000, at Al (describing Internet-enhanced television sports
coverage).
1. See generally ED KROL, THE WHOLE INTERNET 127-154 (1992).
12. For example, one can get a Serb perspective on events in Kosovo from Media

and Publishing Center of Serbian Orthodox Diocese of Raska and Prizen, Kosovo.com
(visited July 11,2000) <http://www.kosovo.com> or an Albanian perspective from AibNet Group, Kosova Crisis Center (visited July 11, 2000) <http://www.alb-net.

com/index.htm>.
13.

See, e.g., Tedesco, supra note 1.
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just the antidote to the gossip, sensationalism, and inaccuracies that
audiences complain about so often today. More than self-selected
documentation, trusted annotation can instill confidence when the story
is right or correct the record in real time.
Annotation could take any number of different forms. I have
already mentioned the online links, discussion boards, or chat rooms
supplied by the underlying information provider and the simultaneous
annotation that occurs when people surf the web to verify or amplify
breaking news they see on television or read in the newspapers.
Another model for the convergent media environment is exemplified by
a growing family of Internet-based software tools variously described
as "distributed portals"' 4 or "browser assistants."' 5 Among the new
products are uTOK, 6 Kenj in, 7 flyswat 8 and ThirdVoice. 9 ThirdVoice
was one of the earliest of these tools, and has already undergone one
complete makeover.
Originally, ThirdVoice called itself a "free browser companion that
allows you to post notes that fuse your own ideas with Web content-adding perspective and stimulating discussion."2 Once a user
downloaded ThirdVoice software, she could post a note to any page on
the web. This note, or annotation, could be made visible to all or a
select group of ThirdVoice users. Such postings did not physically alter
the target web site, at least not as stored in its host server, and they
remained invisible to the visitor who was not equipped with ThirdVoice
software.
Modest experimentation with ThirdVoice revealed somewhat
finicky software and relatively few annotations; revenue opportunities
were not obvious. Today, the software is less finicky, the number of
annotations is practically limitless, and revenue opportunities abound.2 '
14. Bob Metcalfe, Bob Metcalfe 'sReportfrom DEMO, INFOWORLD.COM (visited July
11, 2000) <http://www.infoworld.com/articles/op/xml/00/02/09/000209
opmetcalfeflash.xml>.
15. Jennifer Tanaka, The Web's Best Friends, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 13, 2000, at 70-72.
16. See uTOK, Inc., Welcome to uTOK! (visited July 11, 2000) <http://

www.uTOK.com>.
17. See Autonomy Systems Limited, Inc., Kenjin (visited July 11, 2000) <http://
www.kenjin.com/kenjin.html>.
18. See Flyswat, Inc., Flyswat-Answers on the Fly (visited July 11, 2000) <http://
www.flyswat.com/>.
19. See ThirdVoice, Inc., ThirdVoice (visited July 11, 2000) <http://
www.thirdvoice.com/>.

20. From a previous version of<http://www.thirdvoice.com>, no longer available.
21. ThirdVoice's "partners" include, among others, U.S. News and World Report and
investment advisers Motley Fool. See ThirdVoice, Inc., Leading Internet and Media
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Now, when Third Voice users surf the web with the software turned on,
they will see their favorite web pages annotated with bright orange lines
underscoring key words. Clicking on one of those underscored
words-typically companies, places, celebrities, etc.-will shrink the
underlying web page and launch a smaller window to the right of the
first. That window contains a variety of predetermined links that lead
to more information about the key word. It may also contain messages
posted by other Third Voice users who have visited the underlying page.
Users are encouraged to create their own "active words," instantly
annotated with a built-in search engine and, if desired, the user's own
commentary.
Once perfected and popularized by ThirdVoice or some other
company, the technology could be built into every browser and
transform the way the web is used.2 One can easily imagine a version
of this kind of technology being used to challenge the accuracy of news
stories, the integrity of political campaign advertising, or the quality of
entertainment programming. One can imagine postings that link to
supporting or supplementary data, in real time or after careful deliberation, by experts, stakeholders, or ordinary people. One can imagine an
entire industry dedicated to facilitating these annotations.
And one can easily imagine a copyright infringement lawsuit. Even
though the underlying web page is not altered, the annotated web page,
as it appears on the user's computer screen, could arguably be considered an infringing derivative work.23 The annotations have no meaningful existence absent the underlying web page, whose owner has no
control over the appearance of those orange hyperlinks on the visitor's
computer screen, nor over the information and opinion they invoke.
Companies Partnerwith ThirdVoice to Extend Brands and Connect with Consumers Online

(visited July 11, 2000) <http://www.thirdvoice.com/about/030100release.htm>.
22. See Michael J. Miller, WhateverHappenedtoJustPlainBrowsing?, PC MAGAZINE
(visited July 11, 2000) <http://www.zdnet.com/pcmag/stories/opinions/
0,7802,2447598,00.html>.
23. This hypothetical was posed in Stacey L. Dogan, Copyright in Cyberspace:
Exclusive Rights and Infringement, in LEARNING CYBERLAW IN CYBERSPACE (Lydia Pallas
Loren ed., 1999), available at <http://www.cyberspacelaw.org>.
A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting works,
such as a translation .... abridgment, condensation, or any other form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which,
as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work."
17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 1998). "Subject to certain limitations, the owner of the
copyright in underlying work has the exclusive right to prepare or authorize the
preparation of derivative works based on the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 106(2)
(1994 & Supp. 1998).
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ThirdVoice has not yet been legally challenged, but some Web masters
have already expressed irritation with the software in postings linked to
the ThirdVoice home page.24 Under conventional copyright analysis, a
24. A conversation that appeared on the ThirdVoice site under the heading "Great
software, but...," but is no longer available, demonstrated this point:
Initial Posting: "I love the innovation behind this software, and think it's
great that feedback can come so easily. However, without a governing
procedure for this software, it can become quite annoying to the
webmaster. Perhaps if the client side application would only show
notes if the web site didn't have something banning them?"
Derek: "That would be GREAT! I do like the idea of these notes, and if
webmasters had at least some control over what shows up at their
page, these notes cold be embraced by the who[le] internet
community!"
Joshua: "Webmasters do not have the right to delete those notes. If
Webmasters were able to do it, well, I can predict that more than 90%
of the notes on the webpage will be deleted. Furthermore, ThirdVoice
merely adds another level of webpage that allows us as consumers or
human beings who are born with the right to freedom of speech to
express our opinions. If I am not mistaken, you must be the
webmasters of many webpages, right? Question: Can anyone tell me
to shut up? Your answer will be 'can' if you agree that webmasters
should have the right to delete our notes."
Derek: "I don't want to be able to delete notes (unless they are blatant
flames...). Never happened on my message boards, but I wouldn't
be surprised if some flamer decided it'd be cool to go talk trash about
every site he could. That wasn't what I was meaning, anyway. I was
talking about having control over having the notes appear on your
pages at all. Maybe just a snippet of javascript that would not let
ThirdVoice post notes on the site. That is not taking away your
freedom of speech, because the content of the page is MINE. I own
it, in a way, when people post notes on my page, they are taking away
my freedom of speech, or press-whichever one it is for the web.
Anyway, since I doubt ThirdVoice will ever do anything, this is kind
of pointless .... "
Argentum: "Actually, since the notes aren't on your page, you have no
control over them, either legally, or otherwise. They are kept on
ThirdVoice's server, I'd assume, so you have no choice as to what is
put on that server. (It doesn't belong to you.)"
Joshua: "The court will decide whether ThirdVoice has trespassed
webmasters' territory. What I mean is that, whenever we as
ThirdVoice users want to read the notes posted by other ThirdVoice
users, we have to retrieve them from the server of thirdvoice.com.
Have we or other ThirdVoice users really posted notes or trespassed
the territory of webmasters? It seems to me that we just write some
notes and paste it on a wall that does not belong to the webmasters.
Take for example, if I am against any policy of the government and
decide to take to the street, I put my opinions on a placard. Does this
placard belong to the one I am protesting against? One day, courts
will decide on that."
Derek: "But if you make the notes show on the page, you are then editing

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

hypothetical Third Voice infringement case would be a close
call. 25
I argue that it should not be a close call at all, that the
Copyright and Patent Clause, coupled with the First Amendment
right to know, requires the courts to read more narrowly the
economic rights of the owner of a web site that has been annotated,26 or to read more expansively the fair use rights of the
annotators, the visitors, and those who make annotation

my page. There are a bunch of red squares [the first version of
ThirdVoice used red 'twisties' to link to comments] on my site. I
don't want that, would you? I'm not arguing against the notes being
next to the page, in the left side of you browser window. What I'm
against is when the red squares are added to the page. There are
design elements that could be really messed with! I like the idea of
this community of people who can make a comment about sites. I use
message boards for that reason! I just don't want my page to look any
different than the way I designed it."
Joshua: "You won't discover the difference ifyou are not using ThirdVoice.
Disable or uninstall ThirdVoice if you think that the notes posted by
ThirdVoice users are really annoying to your eyes. Likewise, if other
users of ThirdVoice find the note markers are annoying, they will
disable or uninstall ThirdVoice too. So, do you have any better
suggestions to tell TV users that other TV users have posted their
notes on a webpage? Shall we replace the note markers with
American flags?"
Derek: "I'm done with this conversation. I don't have time to argue about
this."

Original HTML on file with author.
25. See Twin Peaks Prod. v. Publications Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993)
(holding that a "guide" to the television series Twin Peaks, which summarized the

original teleplays and added commentary, a trivia quiz, and biographical and other
information, was an infringing derivative work). There are no definitive holdings that

address web pages, but the computer-based video game industry has provided two

Ninth Circuit opinions that demonstrate just how uncertain this law can be. Compare
Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that a device that could alter some of the features of a Nintendo game without
permanently altering the computer code in the game cartridge was not a derivative
work and did not violate the copyright held by Nintendo) with Micro Star v. FormGen,
Inc., 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that software that could alter some of the
features of a FormGen game without permanently altering the original code was a
derivative work that likely infringed FormGen's copyright). This article does not
attempt to determine whether ThirdVoice infringes or, more likely, contributes to the
infringement of underlying web sites when users visit the site with the software "turned
on." See infra note 84. It is enough to suggest that some courts may so hold.
26. In addition to the right to create a derivative work, the Copyright Act provides
copyright owners with exclusive rights to reproduce, distribute, publicly perform and
display the works in which they own the copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1994 & Supp.
1998).
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possible."
This kind of technology is vital to restoring the
balance between public access to information and the private
interests of information providers in an era of convergence and
consolidation. First, though, I explore the evidence for the
proposition that Congress does not have the authority to grant
copyrights that constrict, rather than expand, the free flow of
information, and that courts have the obligation to enforce that
principle.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE COPYRIGHT AND PATENT CLAUSE AND
THE "RIGHT TO KNOW"

The search for a doctrinal justification for the above assertion
logically begins with the Constitution itself, particularly its
Copyright and Patent Clause: "Congress shall have the power to
promote the progress of science28 and useful arts, by securing for
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to use
their respective writings and discoveries."2 9 At first blush, the
elucidation of purpose in this clause should provide a solid basis
for this argument. According to Professor Pollack, however,
neither the text, nor its history, nor the interpretive case law
compels such an outcome.3" Coupled with the First Amendment,
and especially its penumbral right to know, however, this clause
may require the government to tailor its grant of copyright
protection to promote the free flow of information and to withhold such protection when the flow of information would be
unduly restricted.3 '
27. Fair use is a limitation on the exclusive rights of copyright owners. "[The fair
use of a copyrighted work... for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching..., scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright." 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 (1994). The act contains a nonexclusive list of factors to be considered in
determining whether a use is fair, including the purpose and character of the use, the

nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the portion used, and
the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the original copyrighted
work. See id. See also discussion infra Part III.
28. By "science," the framers doubtless had in mind the Latin "scientia," or
knowledge. See William Patty, The Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting
the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 907, 910 n.18 (1997).
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
30. See Malla Pollack, The Right to Know?: Delimiting DatabaseProtection at the
Junctureof the Commerce Clause, the IntellectualPropertyClause,and the FirstAmendment,
17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 65-66 (1999).
31. See id. at 72. Professor Pollack's article specifically concerns legislation

introduced under Congress's Commerce Clause authority, but there is no reason why
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Copyright and Patent Clause

A.

There is, indeed, precious little evidence that the Copyright
and Patent Clause itself goes beyond a mere statement of policy
to serve as an enforceable limitation on Congress's power to grant
copyrights. 2 The textual argument for imposing such a limitation
would point to the first clause, "[t]o promote the [p]rogress of
[s]cience and the useful [a]rts,"" as the singular enumerated
power given to Congress. This would comport with the structure
of the rest of Article I, section 8, which empowers Congress "[t]o
lay and collect taxes,"3 4 "[t]o borrow money, 3 1 "[t]o regulate
commerce, "36 and so on. The rest of the clause, "by securing for
limited times . . . - i.e., by enacting copyright and patent laws,
merely describes how this should be accomplished. Therefore,
the argument might go, promotion of knowledge is the only
legitimate purpose of copyright law, and any interpretation of
copyright law that, on balance, diminishes the store of public
knowledge must be invalid.
When one looks at the meager history of the clause, however,
one finds that the first version of this clause proposed to the
Constitutional Convention read, "To secure to literary authors
their copy rights for a limited time., 38 The language was changed
on the recommendation of the Committee of Eleven without
further debate. 31 One could argue that the final version reprethe essence of her analysis would not apply equally to legislation introduced directly
under the authority of the Copyright and Patent Clause. She writes:
I posit a right to know in the form of a duty by the government not to block
access to information. Congress does not have the power to use the
Commerce Clause to create a right to exclude others from information (i.e.,
a quasi-property right) if that right (i) deters the progress of science and the
useful arts, (ii) limits the freedom of the press, (iii) limits the right to petition
the government, or (iv) limits the freedom ofdiscussion through speech. The
mutually reinforcing Intellectual Property Clause and First Amendment may
not be bypassed merely by stating that a statute is enacted pursuant to the
Commerce Clause.

Id.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

For a more complete discussion, see Patry, supra note 28, at 910-14.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 2.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.

38. See JAMES

MADISON, RECORDS OF THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

1787 at 563 (Charles C. Tansill ed., 1989).
39. See id. at 666-67.
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sented a rethinking of that mandate, or merely cosmetics borrowed from the Statute of Anne.4" Neither the Statute of Anne nor
the United States Constitution, however, enshrines "the encouragement of learning" or the "promotion of the progress of
science" as the sole justification for awarding copyrights. The
language of reward is everywhere as prominent as the language of
incentive, 4 and Madison himself saw these private and public
interests as coincident.4 2
Of course, Madison was selling a product. Lord Macaulay
would later view these interests, not as coincident, but as existing
in rough equilibrium. Copyright was the least objectionable way
to remunerate authors, certainly as compared to patronage, in
order to ensure a supply of good books. "For the sake of the good
we must submit to the evil; but the evil ought not to last a day
longer than is necessary for the purpose of securing the good."4 3
The American case of Wheaton v. Peters,44 decided a few years
before Macaulay's speech, seems also to emphasize the public
40. See Act 8 Anne, c. 19 (1710) (Eng.). Unquestionably the precursor of
American copyright law, the statute was subtitled, "An Act for the encouragement of
learning, by vesting copies of printed books in the authors orpurchasers of such copies,
during the times therein mentioned." See J.A.L. STERLING, WORLDCOPYRIGHT LAW 9-10
(1998).
41. Indeed, the preamble to the Statute of Anne reverses the emphasis of its
subtitle:
Whereas printers, booksellers, and other persons have of late frequently
taken the liberty of printing, reprinting, and publishing.., books and other
writings, without the consent of the authors or proprietors of such books and
writings, to their very great detriment, and too often to the ruin of them and
their families; for preventing therefore such practices for the future, and for
the encouragement of learned men to compose and write useful books; may
it... be enacted ....
Id. at 996. Justice Story was of similar mind as he lamented the impoverishment of
authors while the "world has derived immense wealth from their labors":
It is, indeed, but a poor reward, to secure to authors and inventors, for a
limited period only, an exclusive title to that, which is, in the noblest sense,
their own property; and to require it ever afterwards to be dedicated to the
public. But, such as the provision is, it is impossible to doubt its justice, or
its policy, so far as it aims at their protection and encouragement.
JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR ExPosrrIoN OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 118

(1840).
42. "The utility of this [copyright and patent] power will scarcely be questioned
.... The public good fully coincides ... with the claims of individuals." THE
FEDERALISTNO. 43, at 271 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

43. Lord Macaulay, Speech Deliveredin the House of Commons, 3 Feb. 1841, in PROSE
AND POETRY 731,733-37 (G. Young ed., 1967).

44. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
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over the private interest by confining the plaintiffs rights to the
terms of the federal copyright statute.4 5
Later cases support that reading. "The sole interest of the
United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly
lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of
authors," Chief Justice Hughes wrote in 1931 .46 "The copyright
law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a
secondary consideration," wrote Justice Douglas in 1947.4 "The
economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to
grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in
48
'Science and useful Arts."'
But even if the foregoing establishes the priority of the public
interest in incentive over the private interest in reward, it does not
bring us to a self-executing Constitutional mandate. Professor
Jaszi suggests that
legislative and judicial attempts to apply this rhetorically
satisfying formula to actual cases immediately confront
questions that defy empirical analysis: How much of a reward
is appropriate in exchange for a given amount of public
availability? How long should a copyright endure? And how
intense should copyright protection be if it is to provide
adequate incentive without producing unnecessary restrictions
on access?49
Nowhere is the inadequacy of the Copyright and Patent
Clause as a guide to policy making more apparent than in Justice
O'Connor's oft-quoted assertion that the "Framers intended
copyright itself to be an engine of free expression." ° While this
statement might seem merely a continuation of the rhetoric cited
above, it is instead the predicate for what amounts to an assertion
that statutory construction and not constitutional analysis, that
Congress and not the Supreme Court, will determine the scope of

See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 257 (1985).
46. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1931).
47. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1947)..
48. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
45.

49. Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship",

1991 DuKE L.J. 455,464.
50. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
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any limitation the Clause imposes.5

In the end, we are left with

Professor Pollack's insight that the constitutional mandate for
reconsidering copyright protections in the digital era lies in the

Patent Clause and the First Amendnexus of the Copyright 5 and
2
ment's "right to know.
B.

The First Amendment Right to Know

Unfortunately, the right to know is itself problematic. Some
of the nation's finest First Amendment scholars have found in the
right to know an invitation to direct governmental regulation to

preserve the diversity of voices and other values threatened by
consolidation in the media market." The touchstone for these
scholars5 4 is the 1969 case of Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v. FCC.55
In that case, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
FCC's fairness doctrine, specifically its requirement that broadcasters provide free air time for reply to anyone who was person5 6
ally attacked during the discussion of a public controversy.
Justice White's emphasis in Red Lion on the "paramount" right of
the viewers and listeners became the mantra of those advocating
government intervention in the arena of free speech."
51. Justice O'Connor continues:
In view of the First Amendment protections already embodied in the
Copyright Act's distinction between copyrightable expression and
uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and
comment traditionally afforded by fair use, we see no warrant for
expanding the doctrine of fair use to create what amounts to a public figure
exception to copyright.
Id. at 560.

52. See generally Pollack, supra note 30 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., OWEN Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996); LEE C.

BOLLINGER,

IMAGES OF AFREE PRESS (1991); Cass Sunstein, The FirstAmendment in Cyberspace, 104
YALE L.J. 1757 (1995). See also J.M. Balkin, Frontiersof Legal Thought 1I The New First

Amendment: Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 395; JAY JENSEN, LIBERALlSM, DEMOCRACY AND THE
MASS MEDIA (1959).

54. They are variously referred to as legal realists, neoliberals, post-modernists,
and civic republicans.
55. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
56. See id. at 390.
57. Id.
Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to
put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be
expressed on this unique medium. But the people as a whole retain their
interest in free speech by radio and their collective right to have the medium
function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It
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Because this paramount right to know belongs not only to
individuals, but to the public at large, it can (or, perhaps, must)
be vindicated by government intervention when private interests
threaten to stifle the free flow of information. And that, or so the
theory goes, is precisely what is happening today. Through
mergers and acquisitions, private media companies have so
consolidated their hold on the mainstream media that they have
effectively frozen out dissenting or unorthodox voices and
compromised editorial integrity in the quest for the almighty
dollar.
Journalists feel the impact of consolidation even earlier than
the general public. When we see such phenomena as 60 Minutes'
spiking an important story at the behest of merger-minded
corporate lawyers,5" or the Los Angeles Times' splitting ad revenues
with the subject of a major feature story-without informing its
reporters9-we all die a little inside. At the local level, the used
car scam exposd that never got printed has become a cliche, and
the evening "news" story that promotes network entertainment
programming is now de rigueur. We don't need to be told that
convergence and consolidation jeopardizes our most deeply held
values.
Even in the new media arena, we are beginning to see the
impact of convergence and consolidation.
Last year, AOL
championed a Portland, Oregon, ordinance requiring AT&T
(which had previously acquired cable giant TCI) to open its cablebased platform for broad-band Internet access to all Internet
service providers." This year, AOL-having become a prospecis the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters,
which is paramount. It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather
than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the
Government itself or a private licensee. It is the right ofthe public to receive
suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and
experiences which is crucial here. That right may not be constitutionally
abridged either by Congress or by the FCC.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
58. See, e.g., Jonathan Alter, Blowing Smoke at CBS, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 4, 1995, at 45;
Howard Kurtz, Details of UnairedTobacco Story Emerge, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1995, at
A3.
59. See, e.g., William Prochnau, Down and Out in L.A., AM. JOURNALISM REv.,

Jan./Feb. 2000, at 58.

60. See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae The openNET Coalition, AT&T Corp, v.
City of Portland (9th Cir. 1999) (No. 99-35609).
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tive cable giant itself through the acquisition of TimeWarner-called off its lobbyists in Maryland and Virginia, where
open-access legislation had been introduced. 6 ' Even when the two
firms announced a "memorandum of understanding" pledging to
allow open access,62 legislators conducting hearings on the merger
expressed serious misgivings.6 3
Yet we know instinctively that government intervention is not
the solution. Our blood boils when we learn that the government
has bribed our corporate bosses to insert anti-drug messages into
entertainment scripts and thus "buy down" low-cost public
interest advertising commitments-commitments that would not
have been made in the first place but for vestigial government
regulation of broadcasting.6 4 "Could the government pay the
networks to slip idle comments into ER about the virtues of a
particular health care policy?"6 First ER, then 20/20, then the
Evening News?
That instinct tends to make us more comfortable with another
group of scholars who sees government regulation as antithetical
to the essential autonomy of the press.6 6 These scholars find
61.

See Peter S. Goodman and Craig Timberg, AOL Ends Its Pushfor Open Access,

WASH. POST,Feb. 12, 2000, at Al.

62. See America Online, Inc., AOL & Time Warner Announce Frameworkfor
Agreements to Offer AOL Service & Other ISPs on Time Warner BroadbandCable Systems
(visited July 12, 2000) <http://media.web.aol.com>.
63. See Ariana Eunjung Cha & Peter S. Goodman, AOL, Time Warner Try to Allay
Fears,WASH. POST, Mar. 1,2000, at El. "'The most significant danger to the promise
ofthe Internet is the possibility that a single company or a handful ofcompanies control
who can access or develop applications and content,' said committee Chairman Orrin
G. Hatch (R-Utah)." Id. Those misgivings were only intensified recently when TimeWarner, in a contract dispute with Disney, briefly refused to carry ABC broadcast
signals on several of its cable outlets. See Steve McClellan & John M Higgins, Disney
Triumphant, BROADCASTING & CABLE, May 8, 2000, at 8.
64. See Daniel Forbes, Prime Time Propaganda SALON (visited July 12, 2000)
<http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2000/01/13/drugs/index.html>. See alsoCharles
Krauthammer, A Network Sellout... , WASH.POST, Jan. 21, 2000, at A29.
65. See House Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer
Protection, The White House, the Networks and TV Programming,Oversight Hearing,
Prepared Statement of Robert Corn-Revere (visited July 12, 2000) <http://
com-notes.house.gov>.

66. See, e.g., LUCAS A. POWE, JR.,THE FOURTHESTATEANDTHECONSTITUTION (1991);
C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN L[BERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989). See also Thomas G.

Krattenmaker & Lucas A. Powe, Jr., Converging First Amendment Principles for
ConvergingCommunicationsMedia, 104 YALE L.J. 1719 (1995); Steven G. Gey, The Case
Against Postmodern Censorship Theory, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 193 (1996); Steven Helle,
Essay on the Bill of Rights: Whither the Public's Right (Not) to Know? Milton, Malls, and
Multicultural Speech, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 1077.
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support in the Supreme Court's rapid retreat from Red Lion, a
retreat that culminated in Miami HeraldPublishingCo. v. Tornillo.6 7
In that case, the Supreme Court struck down a Florida statute
requiring newspapers to provide a right of reply that was constitutionally indistinguishable from the fairness doctrine upheld in Red
Lion, except that the context was newspapers, rather than television. Because these scholars accept the premise that a right to
know necessarily invites government regulation, however, they
tend to reject or severely limit the concept.6 8
My own survey of the cases suggests that the Supreme Court
has repeatedly recognized the existence of the right to know, even
while leaving its scope and limits fuzzy. Any number of cases
recognize at least the limited right to prevent government

interference with a willing speaker's liberty,69 but only Red Lion
67. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).

68. See, e.g., POWE, supra note 66, at 257 ("The right to know is not a right; it's a
slogan. Furthermore, it is a dangerous slogan, because it instantly invites inquiry into
the actual performance of a newspaper. Instead of giving the press more rights, it runs
the risk of denying the press its most sacred possession, its autonomy."); BAKER, supra
note 66, at 67.
69. See, e.g., First Nat. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 n.31 (1978) (striking
down a state law limiting corporate contributions to referendum campaigns, asserting
that the "First Amendment rejects the 'highly paternalistic' approach of statutes...
which restrict what the people may hear"); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,48-49 (1976)
(striking down limits on campaign spending on the ground that "the concept that
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance
the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment"); Procunier v.

Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,419 (1974) (per curiam) (striking down regulations governing
the censorship ofprisoner correspondence, holding that both sender and recipient derive
"a protection against unjustified governmental interference with the intended
communication" from the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Red Lion Broad. Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (striking down a
Georgia law that imposed criminal penalties for mere possession of obscene materials);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1946) (reversing the conviction of a
Jehovah's Witness for distributing literature on the sidewalks of a company-owned
town, on the ground that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit censorship of
the information the residents of the town need to be properly informed, good citizens);
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945) (reversing the conviction of a union
organizer for speaking to a group of workers without the required state license, on
grounds that the license requirement imposed an unconstitutional "restriction upon
Thomas's right to speak and the rights of the workers to hear what he had to say.");
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (upholding the right of individual
householders to receive advertisements distributed door to door); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters of Holy Names, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that the liberty interest protects
the right of parents to educate their children in private schools); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that the right to receive information, including foreign
language training, is a protected "liberty interest" under the Due Process Clause). But
see Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (rejecting a "right to know" argument to
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and other broadcasting cases70 hold that this right to know invites

government intervention to suppress the right of some to speak in
order that other voices may be heard. 7 '
Significantly, three important cases find a right to know that

is independent of anyone's right to speak. In Lamont v. Postmaster
General,7 2 the Supreme Court appeared to vindicate a First
Amendment right to receive information without regard to the
rights of the speaker-unless one stretches the First Amendment
right to speak to the government of the People's Republic of
China. Nor were speakers' rights considered in Virginia State
Boardof Pharmacyv. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council," although
willing First Amendment speakers were obviously waiting in the
wings.74 Finally, in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia," the court
found a right to receive information despite unwilling private and
government speakers.7 6 Thus, the notion that a First Amendment
right to know exists independently of the right to speak is
supported by more than obiter dicta.
That is important because, if there is no independent right to
know, then the right to know is limited in its effect to preventing
government interference with a willing speaker."" But if the right
challenge restrictions on travel to Cuba).
70. See, e.g., CBS v. Democratic Nat. Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (holding that the
First Amendment did not compel broadcasters to take paid editorial advertising, but
apparently leaving open the possibility that the First Amendment would not prevent the
FCC from imposing such a requirement in the public interest).
7 1. In fact, several cases explicitly contradict this proposition. See Board of Ed.
v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (rejecting a school district's unfettered discretion to
remove books from school libraries, citing the "right to receive ideas [as] a necessary
predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press and
political freedom"); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1,
9-10 (1986) (vacating a Commission order requiring a utility company to disseminate
the literature of a ratepayers' organization, relying in part on Tornillo's proscription
against curtailing one speaker's right to speak in favor of another's).
72. 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (striking down a federal statute requiring a request in
writing as a prerequisite to the delivery of unsealed mail from abroad containing
Communist propaganda material).
73. 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (striking down Virginia's ban on advertising the prices
of prescription drugs).
74. See id. at 756 n.14. The putative "willing speakers" were the national or
regional discount drugstores that wanted to advertise prescription drug prices in
Virginia. Id.
75. 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (affirming the right ofthe public to attend criminal trials).
76. See id. at 559. Originally, the defendant filed the motion to exclude the public
from the courtroom, the prosecution did not oppose it, and the judge approved it. See
id.

77. See Baker, supra note 66, at 67-69.
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to know is enforceable without reference to any speaker, then it
can provide a powerful tool for protecting the public interest in
the free flow of information by preventing the government from
granting intellectual property rights that would have the opposite
effect.
This proposition flows from the work of a new generation of
scholars who were prompted to take a hard look at the relationship between the First Amendment and intellectual property rights
by the legislative over-reaching of corporate copyright owners

eager to protect their economic interests in the digital environment."8 The targets of these scholars include the proposed
Uniform Commercial Code Article 2B, now circulating among
state legislatures as the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act ("UCITA");"' the Digital Millennium Copyright Act;"0
and the proposed Collections of Information Antipiracy Act
("CIAA").8 ' In each case, traditional First Amendment "safety

78. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354 (1999); Pamela
Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention
Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (1999); Pollack, supra note

30.
79. See National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, Uniform
2000)
Computer Information Transaction Act (visited July 12,
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/cital0st.htm>. See also Carol A. Kunze,

UCITA Online (visited July 12, 2000) <http://www.ucitaonline.com>.
80. 17 U.S.C. § 1201-1205 (Supp. 1998) (prohibiting the circumvention of
technological measures designed to prevent access to or infringement of copyrighted.
material or tampering with copyright management information).
81. In 1998, the House of Representatives passed the CIAA, which was then
introduced, but died, in the Senate. There are presently two legislative proposals for
database protection in the 106th Congress: H.R. 354, Collections of Information
Antipiracy Act, sponsored by Rep. Howard Coble (R-N.C.); and H.R. 1858, the
Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act, sponsored by Rep. Tom Bliley (RVa.). Both were awaiting floor action at this writing. See Thomas, Legislative
Information on the Internet, H.R. 354 (visited July 12, 2000) <http://rs9.loc.gov>;
Thomas, Legislative Information on the Internet, H.R..1858 (visited July 12, 2000)
<http://rs9.loc.gov>.
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valves"-including the first sale doctrine 2 and fair use" 3 -have
been weakened or eliminated by copyright owners who recognize
and fear the power of the Internet to facilitate copying and
distribution of protected information products.
Because the first sale doctrine and fair use are mechanisms
for preserving the public interest in works of authorship against
the private interests of the copyright owners, their diminishment
implicates both the Copyright Clause's grant of authority for
Congress to "promote the progress of science" and the First
Amendment right to know. These constitutional provisions, taken
together, require that the courts narrowly construe the Copyright
Clause's grant of authority and subject any expansion of that
authority to heightened scrutiny. Any grant of copyright authority that constricts the free flow of information to the public must
be struck down unless it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Alternatively, judicial remedies may
be fashioned to protect the public's interest while avoiding direct
constitutional adjudication. Such remedies might include an
expansive reading of the fair use defense, or a narrow reading of
such affirmative rights as the right to copy, distribute, or make
derivative works. In Part IV, we will consider what this means
for preserving First Amendment values when they are most
seriously threatened by protected First Amendment actors: the
media owners themselves.
IV. CONCRETE EXAMPLES
To see how this principle might work in practice, consider the
pending case of Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse
Ministry. 4 In that case, the United States District Court for the
District of Utah has granted a preliminary injunction barring the
82. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994). "Notwithstanding the provisions of section
106(3),.the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title,
or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or
phonorecord." Id. The "first sale doctrine" enables the purchaser of a newspaper, for
example, to give it to a friend, place it in a library, or post clippings on a bulletin board.
Seeid. An online distributor ofthat same newspaper could deprive the purchaser of any

such right by selling read-only access-and potentially inhibit the dissemination of
information.
83. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). See also supra note 27.
84. 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah 1999).
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defendant from linking to web sites that contained allegedly
infringing copies of a religious book published by the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.8 5 The plaintiff owns the
copyright in the book, while the defendant operates a ministry-and web site-dedicated to "document[ing] problems with
the claims of Mormonism and compar[ing] LDS doctrines with
Christianity."S
The court held that plaintiff was likely to establish at trial
that certain unidentified defendants, unaffiliated with the Utah
Lighthouse Ministry ("ULM"), directly infringed plaintiffs
copyright by posting portions of the Church Handbook of Instructions on three web sites.8 7 Finding that the plaintiff had not shown
that ULM contributed to that infringement,8 8 the court nevertheless held that-by linking to the infringing sites and encouraging
visitors to use those links-ULM might well be liable for
contributing to infringement by any third parties who might
browse the infringing web sites.8 9
The court gave short shrift to defendants' arguments that their
First Amendment rights would be infringed by a preliminary
injunction. "The First Amendment does not give defendants the
right to infringe on legally recognized rights under the copyright
law,"9 ° the court said. "The court, in fashioning the scope of
injunctive relief, is aware of and will protect the defendants' First
Amendment rights."'" The court's entire analysis under the
"public interest" prong of the injunctive relief test consisted of a
single sentence: "Finally, it is in the public's interest to protect
the copyright laws and the interests of copyright holders."9 2
85. See David Carney, Tech Law Journal,Summary of Intellectual Reserve v. Utah
Lighthouse Ministries (LDS Copyright Case) (last modified Dec. 29, 1999) <http://www.

techlawjournal.com/courts/Ids/Default.htm>.
86. See Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Welcome to the Official Website of Utah Lighthouse

Ministry (visited July 12, 2000) <http://www.utlm.org>.
87. See Utah Lighthouse, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 1293.

88. See id. at 1294.
89. See id. at 1294-95. Any visit to the infringing material would constitute a direct
infringement, the court held, because the material would be copied into the visitors'
random access memory. See id. See also MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.,

991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993). In the case ofThirdVoice, supra text accompanying
notes 15-26, the derivative work would be created (if at all) in the visitor's random
access memory. ThirdVoice would simply facilitate that process.
90. Id. at 1295.
91.

75 F. Supp. 2d at 1295.

92. Id.
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Although ULM had not yet raised the affirmative defense of
fair use, another recent decision offers little encouragement. In
Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic,93 the United States District
Court for the Central District of California granted plaintiffs'
motion for summary adjudication rejecting defendants' fair use
defense. Plaintiffs included the Los Angeles Times and The
Washington Post Company; defendant Free Republic is a politically conservative, web-based opinion forum on which registered
visitors post news articles and comment on them.9 4
With respect to the first fair use factor, the purpose and
character of the use, the court found nothing transformative in the
added comments of visitors to the site"' and gave little weight to
defendants' argument that the site's primary purpose was "to
facilitate the discussion, criticism and comment of the registered
users" that follows the posting.96 Instead, the court concluded that
the site was "commercial"-regardless of Free Republic's profit
or nonprofit status or motives-because "[t]he fact that the
articles are posted on the web page allows visitors to review
archived material without paying the fee they would be charged
if they visited plaintiffs' web sites."9 7
The court conceded that the second fair use factor-the nature
of the copyrighted work-cut in favor of the defendants when the
works are news articles.9 8 But it ruled that the third factor-the
amount and substantiality of the use-favored the plaintiffs when
entire articles were copied.9 9 The court declined to accept
defendants' argument that full-text copying was essential to the
purpose of the use, finding it merely conclusory.100 Finally, the
court found that "the availability of the papers' news articles in
full text on the Free Republic site fulfills at least to some extent
the demand for the original works and diminishes plaintiffs'
Thus, despite defenability to sell or license their articles."''
93. No. 98-7840 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 1999).
94. See id., slip op. at 1. See also Benkler, supra note 78 at 357; Free Republic,
L.L.C., www.FreeRepublic.com Conservative News Forum (visited July 12, 2000)
<http://www.freerepublic.com/>.

95. See Free Republic, No. 98-7840, slip op. at 12.
96. Id.
at 16-19.
97. Id.at 19.
98. See id. at 21.

99. See id. at 24.
100. See id
101. Free Republic, No. 98-7840, slip op. at 26.
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dants' claim of a positive impact on plaintiffs' web site "hits" and
corresponding advertising revenue, the court found the fourth
factor-potential market impact-favored the plaintiffs.
In considering defendants' independent First Amendment
argument, the court held that even a generous interpretation of
defendants' rights would be defeated by the fact that users could
post summaries of or links to the copyrighted articles.102 "While
defendants and users of freerepublic.com might find these options
less ideal than being able to copy entire news articles verbatim,
their speech is in no way restricted by denying them the ability to
infringe on plaintiffs' exclusive rights in the copyrighted news
articles." ' 3
Neither case deviates from traditional copyright analysis, and,
while one might differ with one or more of either judge's
conclusions, there is no apparent abuse of discretion. Yet both
decisions have the effect of negating or sharply reducing the
endorsement and annotation functions that will become vital to
realizing the informing and educating potential of the new
medium I predicted above. A heavier First Amendment weight on
the scale would have tipped both decisions in favor of the public
interest.
V. MEDIA PROFESSIONALISM
Reinterpreting copyright law to narrow the definition of
derivative works, or broaden the scope of fair use, will not solve
all the problems of consolidation and convergence. For example,
it will not improve the quality of the underlying news product.
The important but sensitive news story that has been spiked or
sanitized because of the government's potential embarrassment or
the publisher's financial interests cannot become the predicate for
further analysis and comment."4
102. See id. at 28 (citing MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, 1.10[D] (1999), for the proposition that the First Amendment allows
otherwise infringing copies where "copying of the expression is essential effectively
to convey the idea expressed").

103. Free Republic, No. 98-7840, slip op. at 28.
104. As this essay was being finalized for publication, the Boston Heraldsuspended
a reporter who alleged that his editors censored his coverage of FleetBoston, which
advertises regularly in the newspaper and holds the $20 million mortgage on the Herald
Building. The paper called it an "internal disciplinary matter." David L. Greene,
Suspension ofBoston Reporter Raises the Specter of Censorship, BALTIMORE SuN, May 4,
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It can, however, clear the way for annotations that affirm and
reinforce good journalism, while fixing mistakes, filling gaps, and
countering biases that find their way into the mainstream media.
Relieved of the threat of legal action," 5 we can expect a rich mix
of annotations from readers and subjects, from interested parties
and disinterested experts, even from competitors and independent
journalists.
While we wait for this golden age to materialize, for bold
action from legislatures that have been cowed by the software and
motion picture industries into exalting intellectual property rights
above all other values, and from courts that increasingly view
reporters as public enemy number one, we need to rethink our
own roles in this new media environment and join together in
collective action to preserve the integrity of our craft.
We have already formed associations-such as the Society of
Professional Journalists0 6 and the American Society of Newspaper Editors' 7 -that aspire to safeguard our commitment to ethical
journalism in the face of owners and publishers who would tear
down the walls that separate editorial from advertising departments or erect new walls to protect the interests of corporate
owners. We have also created unions or guilds that protect us
from material retaliation for ethical assertiveness. But we can and
must do more.
We must begin to recreate our relationship with our employers for an era when journalists are often far removed from the
owners of the media. That distance was not nearly so great when
A.J. Liebling wrote that "[fireedom of the press is guaranteed
only to those who own one."'0 " While no one would deny a
2000, at 3A.
105. Alas, that may take some time. Even where courts have rejected intellectual
property claims that impede free speech (and defy common sense), attorneys are still
using the threat of legal action to intimidate critics. Compare Lucent Technologies v.
Lucentsucks.com, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6159 (E.D. Va. May 3, 2000) (dismissing
Lucent's complaint under the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125) with Letter from Sarah B. Deutsch, Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc., to
Emmanuel Goldstein, 2600 Enterprises, May 5, 2000 (asserting that the domain name
Goldstein registered-verizonreallysucks.com-infringes on Bell Atlantic trademarks
and violates anti-cybersquatting legislation) 2600 Magazine, News Archives (visited July
12, 2000) <http://www.2600.com/news/2000/0508.html>.
106. See Society of Professional Journalists, Ethics in Journalism(visited July 12,
2000) <http://www.spj.org/ethics/>.
107. See ASNE, supra note 4.
108. A. J.LIEBLING, THE PRESS 32 (Pantheon Books 1981) (1975).
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General Electric or Disney their constitutional freedom from
government regulation with respect to their media interests, no
one should imagine that these corporate entities are the repositories of all that we mean by a "free press." Journalists must find
a way to assert the independence we need to fulfill our obligation
to society.
While we have long eschewed the concept of "professional,"
for a variety of valid reasons, not the least of which is another
invitation to regulation,' 0 9 we can perhaps find a journalistic
analogy to the academic freedom that permeates the relationship
between teacher-scholars and their institutions. "0 Both reporter
and professor are, at once, employees who serve specific masters
and free agents who serve the public interest in accord with a
sacred set of principles. We must undertake collective action to
protect that latter role in the new era.
The tenure system that has served academics so well in this
regard does not seem realistic for journalists. Publishers, and
perhaps journalists as well, have even resisted the idea of a
universal set of ethical standards as an infringement upon press
But where the alternative may be government
freedom. "'
regulation, and the public is at best indifferent, if not hostile,
perhaps a new ethical manifesto is in order. Such a manifesto
would outline the substantive responsibilities of employers of
journalists with respect to editorial integrity. We cannot legally
impose such a manifesto on our employers as long as they are
First Amendment actors, but we can exert collective pressure to
induce the major players to adopt it.
VI. CONCLUSION

Technology, law and ethics all have a role to play in the new
media world. Technology will provide the means by which we
can correct some of the problems with homogenized journalism.
Law-in time-will recognize the need to allow those technological tools to flourish unencumbered by outdated notions of
109. See Robert Drechsel, The Paradox ofProfessionalism: Journalism and Malpractice,
23 U. ARK. LIrTLE ROCK L. REv. 181, 190 (2000).
110. See BAKER, supra note 66, at 253-55.
111. See, e.g., Mark Fitzgerald, Ethics Codes Out of the Closet, EDITOR & PUBLISHER,
Oct. 16, 1999, at 10. See also Bill Kirtz, Play itAgain, Bill, EDITOR& PUBLISHER, Feb. 28,

2000, at 17, 19 (interview with Bill Kovach).
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intellectual property rights. But in the end, the very best journalism will depend upon an ethical understanding among reporters,
editors, publishers, and corporate owners. The public has a right
to the independence ofjournalists vis-a-vis the media empires that
employ them.
The journalist, not the corporate owner and
certainly not the government, is the best guarantor of a free press
going into the twenty-first century.

